Virtues
Aristotle
In Aristotle's NE II.7, he lists eleven moral virtues in order to illustrate that virtue is always referred to the mean between two extremes, an excess and a defect. These virtues are, then, explored in depth in books 3–5. The chart below represents the name for the various virtues and opposing vices as well as the matter with which these virtues are concerned. For some of the virtues, I have added some loose modernized translations, which help to capture the meaning of the term in modern idiom.
Thomas Aquinas
Rereading NE II.7 in ST I-II, q. 60, a. 1: Aquinas's Derivation of the Moral Virtues
Thomas Aquinas accepted Aristotle's list of eleven moral virtues, but he attempted to give a strict derivation of this list. To do so, he used his own highly developed Aristotelian psychology of the powers of the soul. The result was a reconceptualization of the eleven moral virtues listed by Aristotle as eleven virtues concerned with the appetites of the soul (10 with the sense appetites and one with the rational appetite or will). These along with the virtue governing the operation of the practical intellect, prudence, constitute, for Aquinas, the twelve moral virtues.
The Cardinal Virtues
Of all the moral virtues, four have traditionally been set aside as of preeminent importance. These are the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, moderation (temperance), and courage (fortitude). Plato lists these four in his Republic. Aquinas offers an explanation of how these traditional chief or "cardinal" virtues relate to the eleven moral virtues listed by Aristotle. In keeping with his psychological procedure for deriving the moral virtues, Aquinas sees each cardinal virtue as representing a virtue of a particular power of the soul.
Intellectual vs. Moral Virtues
Aquinas's procedure for deriving the eleven moral virtues in NE II.7 is reflected more broadly in his procedure for deriving all the virtues mentioned by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, including the intellectual virtues, discussed in NE VI. Aquinas links each virtue to a particular power of the soul as governing its distinctive operation or its operation as under the control of another power. For instance, the virtues of the practical intellect govern the operations of the intellect insofar as these intellectual operations are under the direction of the will. The virtues of the appetites control the operations of these appetitive powers insofar as they fall under the control of reason (intellect and will).